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Abstract: Conventional wisdom has it that policy innovation is better promoted in a
federal rather than in a unitary system. Recent research, however, has provided theo-
retical evidence to the contrary: a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized|due to
the existence of a horizontal information externality|by under-provision of policy in-
novation. This paper presents a simple model that introduces political competition for
federal o±ce. Under such competition political actors use the innovative policies in order
to signal ability to the electorate. In the equilibrium analyzed policy innovation occurs
more frequently than in a unitary system. It is thus shown that, once electoral motives
are accounted for, the conventional wisdom is validated.
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A commonly held view is that ¯scal federalism promotes innovative public programs and
speeds up the process of policy experimentation and its di®usion.1 This view is rooted
in the argument that the division of the economy into a number of independent localities
gives them the opportunity to experiment with policies. With several jurisdictions ex-
perimenting, the likelihood of ¯nding the best policy is higher than if the control of the
policy choice is left to the central government.2 This view is most vividly summarized
in the following citation by Justice Brandeis:
`It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.'3
While this statement has received widespread support, recent theoretical analysis sug-
gests the contrary: a decentralized system is conducive to producing fewer policy in-
novations than a centralized one. This might be, for instance, the case either because
of political risk|as in Rose-Ackerman (1980)|or because of a horizontal information
externality, as in Strumpf (2002). It is this latter explanation that is, partly, at the heart
of this paper.
Strumpf (2002) considers a model in which local policymakers decide on policy
experiments the outcomes of which are correlated across states. This correlation creates
a learning externality and therefore an incentive for the policymakers to free-ride on
each other's innovative e®orts. This incentive to free ride leads, typically, to under-
1This view has been recently expressed by the U.S federal government with regards to abatement
technologies. The administration's chief climate negotiator, Harlan Watson, defended the U.S climate
policy listing a variety of initiatives by states and communities. This `bottom-up approach' is based on
the fact that states are like `laboratories where new and creative ideas and methods can be applied and
shared with others and inform federal policy.' Herald Tribune, December 11, 2003, p.1, `Warming feud:
states vs. Bush team', by A. Revkin and J. Lee.
2See, for instance, the insightful survey of Oates (1999), but also Inman and Rubinfeld (1997),
Kollman et al. (2000), and Besley (2001). For an early empirical analysis of the di®usion of innovations
among the U.S states see Walker (1969).
3Brandeis, J. dissenting, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
1experimentation relative to the social optimum that could be generated by a unitary
government.4
An important aspect that is absent from Strumpf (2002) concerns the federal po-
litical institutions and, more importantly, the electoral incentives faced by the state
policymakers in a federal system.5; 6 Arguably, the implementation of new and unknown
policies is more demanding than running `business as usual' since it requires imaginative
leadership on the part of a governor, rather than operational routine. One, therefore,
would expect that in federal contests, being innovative at the state level, may positively
in°uence the voters' perception of the ability of a governor standing for federal o±ce.7
This is, then, the objective of this paper: to incorporate federal elections into an analysis
of policy experimentation by local jurisdictions.
In the model presented in Section 2, two state governors, each of whom can be
of di®erent ability, choose between an experimental policy and a policy with a certain
outcome. After the policy has been implemented, both governors run for the federal pres-
idency and the winner of the elections chooses a federation-wide policy. In this framework
a learning externality, arising from correlation of policy outcomes across states, exists.
This creates incentives for each governor to avoid the cost of experimentation and, if
elected president, to make use of the information procured in the other state. This in-
centive, however, is mitigated by two e®ects; the signaling and the policy e®ect. The
4This con°ict (and the need for more research on this topic) between the conventional wisdom and
the conclusions arrived at by the contributions of Rose-Ackerman (1980) and Strumpf (2002) is also
emphasized in Oates (1999).
5This is insightfully discussed but not formally analyzed in Rose-Ackerman (1980).
6It is quite common observation that in federal systems regional governors run for federal o±ce.
Consider, for instance, the U.S experience: with the exception of George Bush senior all of America's
past ¯ve presidents previously have been governors. The same is true, to give another example, for
Germany where four out of the last ¯ve chancellors were ex-premiers of federal states. Though this does
not show the innovativeness of the governors prior to the federal elections, it does show their level of
political aspirations.
7This view is shared by political observers too. In a commentary, for example, J. Podhoretz notes,
`...although he is not a bold politician, Bush is an innovator. On all these issues [education, social
security and medicare] he has fresh proposals that derive from state and local politics { from experi-
ments by the Republican governors like himself who have come to dominate the 50 state capitals.' The
Times, October 13, 2000. Commentary: `Gore has made his bed, but nobody wants to lie in it.' Bold
face emphasis added.
2former, and to some extent the most obvious, e®ect refers to the incentive of a governor
to signal ability to the electorate by experimenting. The policy e®ect refers to the nature
of the federal political career: a governor anticipating to become president and then to
govern the entire nation will take into account the bene¯t procured to the other state by
her own choice of policy experimentation. It is the combination, and strength, of these
two e®ects that make governors opt for the experimenting public policy.
The simple framework analyzed is rich in implications. It is shown that, strikingly,
the possibility that a federal system is more conducive to policy experimentation than a
unitary system, once the political process for federal o±ce is accounted for, is a real one.
This reverses the conclusion of Rose-Ackerman (1980) and Strumpf (2002) and validates
the conventional wisdom that has been vividly expressed in the quotation by Justice
Brandeis.8
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes
the equilibrium of the model, and Section 4 compares it to the unitary outcome. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We study a dynamic two period model which incorporates signaling and an election
between both periods. We abstract, for simplicity, from discounting between the two
periods. There are two states that are identical in all respects. In period 1 in each state
a governor is in charge of choosing policy. In the end of that period both governors run
for the federal presidency. In period 2 the president selects policy for both states.9
Policymakers are of two abilities: high, denoted by ®, and low, denoted by ®, with,
in particular, ® > ® > 0. Ability is private information. Each policymaker is of high
8This conclusion, though derived in an entirely di®erent context, is reminiscent of the idea that the
existence of a federal government may over-turn the (negative) ine±ciencies arising from non-cooperative
behavior at the state level, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002).
9The issue at the heart of the paper is to compare the incentives of governors for experimentation
arising within a given federal election. We so abstract from incentive considerations arising from the
re-election of the president of the federal system after period 2 (and of the unitary president of Section
4).
3ability with probability ¸ 2 (0;1). The abilities of the two governors are independent of
each other.
In both periods incumbents decide whether to introduce or not a new and innovative
public policy whose return is probabilistic and depends on the policymaker's ability. In
particular, with probability µ its quality10 is high, and denoted by qh + ®, and with
complementary probability 1 ¡ µ it is low, ql + ®, where ® = ®; ®.11 Alternatively, they
use a public policy whose return is certain and given by qo. This policy can have a dual
interpretation: it can be either an old one that has been used in the past or a new policy
with a certain return. It is natural the returns of the policies to be ranked according to
qh + ® > qh + ® > qo > ql + ® > ql + ® > 0: (1)
Central to this paper are the incentives of the policymakers to experiment and so it
is imperative to restrict attention to a policy innovation which is not from the outset
superior to the old policy. We, therefore, assume that
µ ·




This restriction simply says that the innovative policy does not provide a short run
bene¯t to a governor.12 It is then clear, following (2), that any incentive to innovate
arises from the dynamic nature of the model. We turn to this next.
During the ¯rst period, citizens observe the quality qi (qi = qh + ®;qh + ®;qo;ql +
®;ql+®) of the policy in both states and form beliefs about the ability of both governors.
The posterior probability that the governor of state i is of high ability given the quality
qi of the policy is denoted by ¹i(qi). At the end of the ¯rst period there is an election.
Voting is retrospective and citizens elect for president the governor who is more likely to
be of high ability. That is, if ¹i > ¹j;i = 1;2;i 6= j; then citizens elect for president the
10Policies are costly and, without loss of generality, their cost has been suppressed.
11Combining ability and random policy outcome in an additive speci¯cation is a convenient way to
describe the main e®ects while keeping the notational burden to a minimum. The basic insights provided
by the analysis appear in undiminished force with alternative and more general speci¯cations.
12Though the restriction in (2) refers to the high ability governor it, too, holds, following from ® > ®,
for the low ability one.
4governor of state i. In case ¹i = ¹j they toss a coin and each governor is elected with
probability 1=2.
The outcome of the experimenting policy is perfectly correlated across states imply-
ing that the quality of the new policy becomes common knowledge if a state innovates.13
Consequently, if at least one experiment was performed, whoever is in charge of the
policy decision in period 2, is informed about the quality of the new policy.
Policymakers derive utility from the per-period quality of the policy chosen pro-
vided they are in o±ce. In period 2 the governor who is not elected president receives
zero utility.
This model de¯nes a game between both types of the policymakers in both states.
At the beginning of the game Nature chooses the ability type of both governors. A
strategy for each type of governor in state i = 1;2 consists, ¯rst, of a policy decision for
state i in the ¯rst period. The second component is a rule, possibly depending on the
policy outcomes observed in period 1, that speci¯es the policy choices for both states
in period 2, should the governor of state i be elected as president. An equilibrium of
this game consists of a strategy for each ability type of the governor of each state and
of citizens' beliefs satisfying two requirements. Firstly, given the beliefs of the citizens
and the strategies of both types of governor in state j 6= i, the strategy of the governor
of state i has to be optimal whenever this governor is called upon to decide. Secondly,
the beliefs must be consistent with the governors' strategies.
3 The federal system
We start by analyzing the president's choices in the second period after the ¯rst period
election. In the second period the president has no re-election motives and thus chooses
the policy which yields the highest expected quality. If the new policy has been chosen
in the ¯rst period, in at least one of the two states the president is informed about the
new policy's quality. She then chooses the new policy in both states if the quality is
13This is for simplicity. Imperfect correlation across states is feasible but it obscures the main forces
at work.
5qh yielding a payo® 2(qh + ®) where ® is the president's ability. If the quality is ql she
returns to the old policy obtaining the payo® 2qo. If no state has experimented with the
new policy then she chooses, following (2), the old policy with again payo® 2qo.
As noted in the introductory Section, the purpose of this analysis is to show the
possibility that a federal system produces over-experimentation relative to a unitary
state. We do so by picking an equilibrium which is indeed characterized by more inno-
vation relative to a unitary state.14 In this equilibrium in both states the high ability
governor experiments and the low ability governor selects the old policy. This leads to
beliefs ¹i(qh + ®) = ¹i(ql + ®) = 1 and ¹i(qh + ®) = ¹i(ql + ®) = ¹i(qo) = 0 for i = 1;2.
Consider now, given these beliefs, the choices open to a high ability governor in
state i assuming that the governor of state j 6= i behaves according to the hypothesized
strategies. If the governor of state i chooses the new policy her expected ¯rst period
payo® is given by
µ(qh + ®) + (1 ¡ µ)(ql + ®) : (3)
By this choice, she reveals her high ability to the electorate ensuring a belief ¹i = 1. If
the governor of state j is of high ability, her strategy being the same, she also reveals
her type implying ¹j = 1. In this case the governor of state i wins the election with
probability 1=2. If, now, the governor of state j is of low ability she chooses the old policy
which leads to ¹j = 0 ensuring that the governor of state i is elected with probability
1. Using the prior probabilities, the likelihood of governor i winning the election is
¸=2 + 1 ¡ ¸ = (2 ¡ ¸)=2.
If the governor of state i is elected president, in the second period, she knows
with certainty the quality of the new policy, having experimented in the ¯rst period.
Conditional upon being elected the second period payo® after innovating in the ¯rst
period|following the discussion in the ¯rst paragraph of this Section|is
2[µ(qh + ®) + (1 ¡ µ)qo] : (4)
14A full characterization of the equilibria of the model can be provided. This, however, will not
provide any further insights into the e®ects leading to innovation in a federal system. For the sake of
brevity these equilibria are therefore omitted.
6Multiplying now (4) with (2 ¡ ¸)=2 and adding to (3), one obtains the payo® from
choosing the new policy that is,
µ(qh + ®) + (1 ¡ µ)(ql + ®) + (2 ¡ ¸)[µ(qh + ®) + (1 ¡ µ)qo] : (5)
If the governor of state i chooses the old policy the ¯rst period payo® is qo. Having
chosen the old policy the governor of state i is taken to be, following ¹i(qo) = 0, of low
ability. If the governor of state j is of high ability, this happens with probability ¸, the
governor of state i is defeated in the elections obtaining zero second period payo®. With
probability 1 ¡ ¸ the governor of state j is of low ability implying ¹j = 0. In this case
the governor of state i is elected with probability 1=2. Since no experiment has taken
place, the second period payo® for the governor of state i in this case is 2qo. The total
payo® from choosing the old policy, then, is
(2 ¡ ¸)qo : (6)
Comparing (5) and (6) it is immediate from qh + ® > qo that it is optimal for the high
ability governor of state i to choose the new policy.
We now turn to the low ability type governor in state i. If this governor chooses
the old policy then in the ¯rst period her payo® is qo. In this case she is defeated in the
election if the governor of state j is of high ability and she is elected with probability
1=2 if the governor of state j is of low ability. In the latter case the second period payo®,
conditional on winning the election, is given by 2qo. Consequently, the total payo® from
choosing the old policy for the low ability type is given by (6).
If the low ability governor chooses the new policy in the ¯rst period then the ¯rst
period bene¯t is given by (3) with ® replaced by ®: In this case she is elected with
probability 1=2(1 ¡ ¸). Since she has experimented with the new policy the expected
payo® in the second period, conditional on being elected, is then given by (4) with ®
replaced by ®. Combining ¯rst and second period payo®s one obtains
µ(qh + ®) + (1 ¡ µ)(ql + ®) + (1 ¡ ¸)[µ(qh + ®) + (1 ¡ µ)qo] : (7)
7Comparison between (7) and (6) reveals that the low ability governor of state i chooses
the old policy if
µ ·
qo ¡ (ql + ®)
(qh ¡ ql) + (1 ¡ ¸)(qh + ® ¡ qo)
´ µg : (8)
Close inspection of (8) reveals that µg is positive and strictly below µ¤ as de¯ned in (2).
We, therefore, arrive at:
Proposition 1 For all µ 2 [0;µg] there exists an equilibrium where in both states the
high ability governor experiments and the low ability governor selects the old policy.
We turn now to the benchmark case in which policies are chosen by the president
of the unitary nation.
4 The unitary nation
The president of the unitary nation in the ¯rst period chooses the policy for each state.
There are three choices open to her: choose the new policy in both states; choose the
new policy in one and the old policy in the other state; and choose the old policy in both
states.
Consider the high ability type and the ¯rst of these options. Choosing the new
policy in both states in the ¯rst period she obtains payo®, in each state, given by (3).
In the second period, having experimented in the ¯rst, she obtains a payo® given by (4).
Adding these payo®s one obtains
2[2µ(qh + ®) + (1 ¡ µ)(ql + ® + qo)]: (9)
If now she chooses the new policy in one state and the old in the other, in the ¯rst period
she obtains payo® µ(qh + ®)+(1¡µ)(ql + ®)+qo. In the second period, being informed
about the quality of the new policy, she again receives the payo® given by (4). Total
payo® from this choice, then, is
µ(qh + ®) + (1 ¡ µ)(ql + ®) + qo + 2[µ(qh + ®) + (1 ¡ µ)qo]. (10)
8Finally, if she chooses the old policy in both states she obtains a total payo® of 2qo from
each state.
Comparing the payo®s arising from these three choices we ¯rst observe that, from
µ · µ¤, the payo® in (9) is dominated by the payo® in (10). Comparing now the payo®
in (10) with the payo® 4qo (obtained from choosing the old policy in both states) one
concludes that it is optimal for the high-ability president to experiment in one state if
µ ¸
qo ¡ (ql + ®)
(qh ¡ ql) + 2(qh + ® ¡ qo)
´ µp. (11)
Similarly, following analogous reasoning, the low ability president chooses to experiment
in one state if µ ¸ µp, where µp is de¯ned as µp in (11) but with ® replaced by ®. It
is easy to verify, following ® > ®, that µp > µp. Moreover, both µp, µp are positive and
strictly less than µ¤. We so have:
Proposition 2 (i) For all µ 2 [0;µp], it is optimal for both types of the president of the
unitary nation to choose the old policy in both states.
(ii) For all µ 2 [µp;µp], it is optimal for the high ability type president of the unitary
nation to choose the new policy in one and the old policy in the other state. For the low
ability type it is optimal to choose the old policy in both states.
(iii) For all µ 2 [µp;µ¤], it is optimal for both types of president of the unitary
nation to choose the new policy in one and the old policy in the other state.
In order to compare the outcome in the federal system of Proposition 1 with that
of the unitary system of Proposition 2 we now need to relate the critical values µg and µp.
A simple comparison between (8) and (11) (with ® replaced by ®) shows that µp < µg.
Consequently, the interval [µp;µp] is contained in [0;µg].
To progress further in the comparison, we now de¯ne a measure of innovation. A
natural measure in the present context is the expected number of times the new policy
is chosen in the ¯rst period. In the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 three cases
can arise. If there is a high ability type governor in both states, which happens with
probability ¸2, the new policy is chosen twice. With probability 2¸(1 ¡ ¸) there is a high
9ability type governor choosing the new policy in one state only. Finally, with probability
(1 ¡ ¸)
2 both governors are of low ability type producing no innovation. Altogether the
expected amount of innovation is 2¸2 + 2¸(1 ¡ ¸) = 2¸.
Turning now to the choice of the president of the unitary nation, as given in Propo-
sition 2, we observe that for µ < µp there is no innovation. For µ 2 [µp;µp] the president
only chooses the new policy in one state if she is of high ability. In this case the amount
of innovation is ¸. Finally, for µ 2 [µp;µ¤], whatever the type of the president, she chooses
the new policy in one state and the old in the other. The amount of innovation is, then,
1. Summarizing:
Proposition 3 A federal system produces more innovation than the unitary nation for
all µ 2 [0;µp). For all µ 2 [µp;µg] a federal system produces more innovation than the
unitary nation if ¸ > 1=2.
The trade-o® leading to the optimal decision of the president of the unitary nation,
as stated in Proposition 2, is rather simple. On the one hand, innovation is costly
because in expected terms the new policy fares worse than the old policy in period 1.
On the other hand, the information produced in period 1 by experimenting allows for
a higher payo® in the second period. Therefore, if µ is not too low, as in case (ii) of
Proposition 2 for the high ability type, and in case (iii) for both types, the learning
bene¯t outweighs the short term cost of innovation. Hence, the president of the unitary
nation ¯nds it optimal to innovate. If, conversely, µ is too low, then no innovation takes
place in the unitary nation. The president of the unitary nation, however, never performs
two experiments since, due to the perfect correlation of policy outcomes across states, a
second experiment does not provide any additional learning bene¯t.
In the federal system the same trade-o® exists because the governors, too, have an
incentive to learn. The di®erence between the two systems arises from two considerations
introduced by electoral competition. Firstly, with the probability for each governor of
winning the election being less than one, the bene¯t of learning is not fully internal-
ized. Secondly, the high ability governor enhances her electoral prospects by innovating,
10thereby communicating her ability to voters. For this type, the electoral bene¯t always
outweighs the costs of innovation. To see this clearly, consider the extreme case where
the new policy is of low quality with certainty, that is, µ = 0. Switching from the new
to the old policy confers a ¯rst period gain of qo but in the same time reduces the prob-
ability of winning the election by 1=2. Since the second period payo®, conditional on
being elected president, is 2qo, deviating to the old policy does not pay o®. Thus, the
high ability governor innovates even if there is no bene¯t from learning. Obviously, in
the case where both governors are of high ability both have the same electoral motives
to innovate. Consequently, in this case, there may be double innovation in the federal
system.
A low ability governor prefers not to reveal her ability to the voters and hence she
has no electoral motive for choosing the new policy. As a consequence, her decision is
entirely determined by the trade-o® faced also by the president of the unitary nation:
the trade-o®, that is, between the short term costs of innovation and the bene¯t of
learning. Because of the information externality, µg, the minimum value for µ such that
she innovates, is higher than µp, the minimum value of µ required to induce the low
ability type of the president of the unitary nation to innovate. For this reason, if µ
is between these values, the federal system produces more innovation than the unitary
nation only if the prior probability of the high ability type is larger than 1=2.
5 Concluding remarks
Conventional wisdom has it that federalism promotes policy innovation. In contrast,
recent research has emphasized that a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized by
under-provision of policy innovation. The present paper has presented a simple model
introducing political competition into the analysis of a federal system. In the equilibrium
analyzed, policy innovation occurs more frequently than in a unitary nation. This shows
that once electoral motives are accounted for, the conventional wisdom is validated.
The model suggests a number of extensions. Firstly, learning across states and
11between periods may be less than perfect. Secondly, the signal about the governor's
ability conveyed by innovating may not be fully informative. Finally, another avenue
for research is to incorporate other forms of political competition in federal systems.
Certainly, there remains much scope for the analysis of experimentation in richer models
of political competition. We hope to have shown that the task is worthwhile and that
the conclusions can be instructive.
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